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F
ew social sciences seem to have a more pronounced divide 
between qualitative and quantitative work than political 
science. Clearly, the emphasis on either of them varies strongly 
per subfield. Some are clearly and consciously mixed (comparative 
politics comes to mind). Others are sharply contrasted: electoral 
studies are quantitative; political theory is qualitative; the study 
of International Relations is still mainly qualitative; the study of 
national and local politics (be it American, or German, or any other) 
is becoming increasingly quantitative. Even more pronounced 
than the divide between subfields, however, is that between 
individual researchers and research groups and consequently 
that between the outlets they choose (journals, conferences). 
Counterexamples are of course easy to find, but there is no denying 
that, unfortunately, in political science C.P. Snow’s schism between 
‘two cultures’ has become a reality.
Much of this has to do with the fact that, over the course of its 
century long formal existence, political science has developed 
increasingly sophisticated methods, particularly for quantitative 
research. And it seems fair to say that these methods have gained 
the upper hand, if not in terms of volume, then at least in terms 
of academic standing. Things have not always been like this. 
For ages, the study of politics amounted to the study of political 
ideas and political institutions (particularly constitutions). The 
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approach was philosophical and almost exclusively qualitative. 
‘Statistics’ has been practiced since the eighteenth century, but 
it was understood as the clerkish activity of administrating and 
accounting the state’s possessions, rather than as a technique 
for analysing data. Academically, it ranked decidedly below the 
normative and qualitative study of politics. This lasted until the 
Second World War, but since then, everything has changed: 
political theory has become regarded as the ‘softest’ of the field’s 
sub-disciplines (if not relegated to philosophy altogether) and 
the study of constitutional arrangements has been dismissed as 
‘classical institutionalism’ and largely handed over to lawyers. 
By contrast, empirical political research, particularly that which 
uses quantitative data and statistical methods, has become the 
dominant model – so much so, that it serves as a benchmark even 
for many in the more qualitative subfields.
There has, however, also been a backlash. In 2000, an anonymous 
e-mail sparked the so-called Perestroika-movement, which was 
an uprising by a variety of concerned political scientists against 
what they regarded as the over-sophistication and inaccessibility of 
much political science research and the dominance of quantitative 
methods.1 The resulting debate was, as usual, about much more 
than just qualitative and quantitative methods; it was a clash of 
epistemologies and of views on the proper role of social science. 
Perestroika was for some time effective in opening up the debate 
but after a while it  led to a hardening of positions rather than 
reconciliation. The Methodenstreit between ‘quants and quals’, 
or more broadly between positivists and anti-positivists, may not 
be as fierce today as it was back then, but underneath a Cold War 
still seems to go on, characterized by mutual incomprehension, 
avoidance, and occasional eruptions of tension.
In this constellation, every self-conscious political scientist is forced 
to take a position, even if a moderate or mixed one. Professionally 
and pragmatically, if not for better reasons, one has to take a 
stance. Indeed, in one’s choices of topics, methods, and outlets, 
1. Monroe, K.R. (Ed.) (2005). Perestroika! The Raucous Rebellion in Political Science. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
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one unavoidably declares oneself. Hence, in this respect, as in 
several others, I would like to propose an Aristotelian political 
science. As everyone knows, Aristotle was an empiricist who, in 
contrast to Plato, started from the concrete variety of observable 
phenomena. Of course, his methods of data gathering and data 
analysis were far less advanced than ours, but I would argue 
his writings suggest some very sound intuitions on how the 
‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ should be combined. Let me illustrate 
this with two examples, relating to two concepts at the core of 
his (and my own) understanding of the study of politics, namely 
politeia and politikos.
Politeia, first, is commonly translated as ‘constitution’ or regime, 
but has a broader meaning as well; it refers to the entire ‘way of 
life’ of a particular type of political society. Now, in his study of 
constitutions, as in many other things, Aristotle was decidedly 
empirical. He collected no fewer than 158 constitutions – a set 
of cases that would make for an impressive comparative study 
today – and described, compared, and categorized them. His 
analysis in the Politics (particularly book III)2 is methodologically 
simple, but still penetrating. He develops a typology of regimes 
that is based, first and foremost, on a numerical criterion: polities 
are ruled by one, by few, or by many. How few or how many rulers 
exactly are needed to distinguish one regime from another is not 
clearly specified. In fact, it turns out that Aristotle’s typology is 
not purely quantitative for he adds a second, strongly qualitative 
dimension, saying that a regime can be ruled well, in the interest 
of the community, or badly, in the interest of the rulers themselves. 
Moreover, in the course of his discussion it turns out that what first 
seemed to be a purely numerical way of distinguishing regimes, 
is actually much more than that: since the few, if they rule, are 
typically rich and the many poor, the division of regimes turns 
out to be based on a division between classes. The mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative is explicit: “… every city is composed of 
quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, 
2. Aristotle (1988). The Politics (S. Everson, Ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
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good birth, and by quantity, superiority of numbers”.3 And both 
have to be accounted for.
The second key concept is politikos. Perhaps this notion refers 
simply to what we would now call a ‘politician’ or even to a 
politically active citizen. In Aristotle’s ideal polity, after all, citizens 
rule and are ruled in turn. So perhaps a politikos is just someone 
who takes his responsibility of exercising a political role. If that is 
true, politikoi are far from uncommon and there can be many of 
them. At the same time, however, Aristotle’s concept of politikos 
(like that of politeia) seems to carry strong normative overtones. 
Hence it is has traditionally been translated as ‘statesman’, which is a 
term of praise, referring to a great leader with extraordinary political 
virtue. And virtue, as Aristotle states in his Nicomachean Ethic, 
is a mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency.4 This 
notion of a mean again suggests a quantitative approach, in this 
case towards moral excellence, but as Aristotle makes clear, there 
is a qualitative difference between virtue and its ‘surrounding’ vices 
as well. Virtue is an excellence that transcends the spectrum of 
excess and deficiency. The same goes for statesmen in comparison 
to ‘ordinary’ leaders and citizens. Statesmen are, by definition, 
rare and extraordinary (not everyone can count as one). Studying 
statesmanship is therefore also an inherently qualitative exercise. 
Quantitative studies of statesmanship would make little sense, 
not only because there are not enough cases, but also because 
the uniqueness of each statesman and the meaning of his moral 
character can only be grasped by detailed qualitative study. So we 
see in the case of Aristotle’s concept of politikos (and virtue, too), 
as in that of politeia, how he starts with numerical considerations 
but soon moves on to the more pertinent moral differences. The 
quantitative serves as a starting point, but the qualitative quickly 
takes over and is clearly the most important.
Aristotle famously says “it is the mark of an educated man to look 
for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the 
3. Ibid., 1296b 17-19
4. Aristotle (1980). The Nicomachean Ethics (D. Ross, Trans.). Book II, Chapter 6. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
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subject admits”.5 This implies a scepticism towards sophisticated, 
usually quantitative methodologies in political science that I tend 
to share. MacIntyre, perhaps the best-known neo-Aristotelian of 
recent times, points out that the social sciences have miserably yet 
understandably failed in their self-imposed mission to find universal 
laws of human behaviour: “…the salient fact about those sciences 
is the absence of the discovery of any law-like generalization 
whatsoever”.6 And Flyvbjerg, following in the footsteps of Aristotle 
as well, argues that the social sciences can only become relevant 
again if they give up on emulating the natural sciences and opt 
instead for a ‘phronetic’ approach informed by practical experience 
and accounting for the distinct nature of social reality.7 For these 
thinkers, quantitative analyses can be informative, to be sure, 
but they will always remain secondary to and supportive of the 
qualitative and ultimately moral understanding of social reality. 
Without embracing all the criticisms and recommendations they 
provide, I am inclined to think they have pointed in the right 
direction.
5. Ibid., 1094b 24-25
6. MacIntyre, A. (1984). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd ed.). p. 88. Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
7. Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and 
How it Can Succeed Again (S. Sampson, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
